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1. Introduction 
 
Theories of function are conventionally divided up into two main categories, historical 
and ahistorical (or backwards-looking and forwards-looking). The selected effects theory 
(Neander 1983, 1991; Millikan 1984) is an example of a historical theory, but there are 
other historical theories, including some versions of the organizational theory 
(McLaughlin 2001). Ahistorical theories include Boorse’s goal-contribution account 
(1976; 1977; 2002), the propensity theory (Bigelow and Pargetter 1987), and the causal 
role theory (Cummins 1975; Craver 2001; Hardcastle 2002). In the 1970s and 1980s, it 
was common to see these two sorts of theories as competing with each other, though 
more recently, philosophers of biology have generally adopted a pluralistic stance, and 
see them as capturing different aspects of ordinary biological usage (Garson 2018). Still, 
the validity of the basic distinction has never been seriously challenged.  
 
Many proponents of ahistorical theories have argued that we should accept their theories 
precisely on account of their being ahistorical. In other words, their alleged ahistoricity is 
often touted as a significant selling point of their theories, and a strong reason to prefer 
them over historical ones. There are two arguments along these lines. The first argument 
appeals to bald intuition, and says it’s just obvious that functions don’t always need 
history. One fanciful variant of this argument appeals to science fiction cases, like swamp 
creatures, instant lions, and randomly-generated worlds (e.g, Boorse 1976, 74; Bigelow 
and Pargetter 1987, 188). But one doesn’t have to go as far as science fiction to find 
plausible cases of ahistorical functions in biology. Many philosophers have a strong 
intuition that, the very first time a new biological trait emerges and begins to benefit the 
organism, it has a function even if it was never selected for (e.g., Boorse 2002, 66; 
Bigelow and Pargetter 1987, 195; Walsh and Ariew 1996, 498). The second argument, 
which is closely related, appeals to ordinary biological usage instead of intuition. It says 
that historical theories run against the way biologists ordinarily think and talk about 
functions. At least sometimes, when biologists attribute functions to traits, they neither 
cite nor refer to nor think about history or evolution (e.g., Godfrey-Smith 1993, 200; 
Amundson and Lauder 1994, 451; Walsh 1996, 558; Boorse 2002, 73). Hence, ahistorical 
theories capture important strands of real biology.  
 
In light of the above, my thesis might come as a bit of a shock. I claim that there are no 
ahistorical theories of function – or, put more precisely, the mainstream versions of the 
allegedly ahistorical theories on the market aren’t actually ahistorical. If we poke and 
prod at those theories a bit, a historical element falls out, like contraband stashed away in 
a suitcase. In Boorse’s version of the goal-contribution account, history is explicitly 
embedded in his notion of a statistically-typical contribution to fitness. In the propensity 
account, history is embedded, a little less explicitly, in the idea of a species’ natural 
habitat. Finally, the only way the causal-role theorist can hope to make sense of 
dysfunction is to appeal to history.  
 
Before I move on, there is one big qualification I must get out of the way. One could 
invent a purely ahistorical theory of function. One could assert, for example, that all of a 
trait’s effects are its functions. In fact, the biologists Bock and von Wahlert (1965, 274) 
proposed a theory of function very much along these lines. This theory (pan-
functionalism?) would be ahistorical, to be sure, since even if the world were created two 
seconds ago in pretty much its present form, things would still have effects, and so they’d 
still have functions. In fact, sometimes scientists actually do use the word “function” 
synonymously with “effect.” They say things like, “climate change is a function of 
deforestation,” or “poor academic performance is a function of malnutrition.” But this 
isn’t the ordinary biological use, which the theories I cite above are trying to capture. I’ll 
come back to this point in the conclusion. 
 
So, I need to amend my thesis slightly. Instead of saying that there are no ahistorical 
theories of function, I want to say that any theory of function that satisfies two very 
minimal, very traditional, and largely uncontroversial, adequacy conditions, is also a 
historical theory. First, the theory should capture some distinction between functions and 
accidents (the function of the nose is to help us breathe but not hold up glasses). Second, 
the theory should capture the possibility of malfunctioning or dysfunction. If my heart 
seizes up due to cardiac arrest, it’s failing to perform its function or it’s dysfunctional. All 
of the theorists I engage with in this paper purport to satisfy these two adequacy criteria, 
or something in their vicinity, so I’m not begging any questions by insisting on these 
conditions.  
 
Here’s the plan for the rest of the paper. The next three sections will examine Boorse’s 
goal-contribution theory, the propensity theory, and the causal-role theory, in turn. In the 
conclusion, I’ll draw out the big consequences for thinking about functions.   
 
2. Boorse’s Goal-Contribution Account 
 
Boorse’s view (1976; 1977; 2002), at the most general level, is a goal-contribution 
account. It holds that a trait’s function is just its contribution to a goal. Here, I’ll focus on 
the subclass of functions he calls physiological functions. For Boorse, the physiological 
function of a trait is its species-typical contribution to the survival and reproductive 
prospects of an organism (1977, 555; 2002, 72). (To be more precise, Boorse carves up 
species into subgroups based on age and sex; the function of a trait is its typical 
contribution to fitness within the members of that subgroup.) Though he doesn’t define a 
corresponding notion of dysfunction, he defines a closely related notion of disease: a 
disease is simply a state that “reduces one or more functional abilities below typical 
efficiency (1977, 555).” 
 
Neander (1991, 182) raised a now-famous objection against Boorse; she pointed out that 
Boorse’s view, as it stands, can’t make sense of pandemic dysfunction: “dysfunction can 
become widespread within a population…A statistical definition of biological norms 
implies that when a trait standardly fails to perform its function, its function ceases to be 
its function; so that if enough of us are stricken with disease (roughly, are dysfunctional) 
we cease to be diseased, which is nonsense.” Pandemic dysfunctions, moreover, don’t 
just occupy the realm of science fiction, as in P. D. James’ The Children of Men. UV 
radiation poisoning in anurans is a good example of pandemic dysfunction. Sadly, 
climate change might create many more pandemic dysfunctions very soon. A good theory 
of function shouldn’t close off the possibility that all, or most, tokens of a certain trait in 
a certain species are dysfunctional (or as Boorse prefers, “diseased”).  
 
Intriguingly, Boorse doesn’t deny the possibility of pandemic disease. Instead, he says 
that in order to make sense of pandemic disease, one has to appreciate function’s 
historical depth. Specifically, when we consider what’s “statistically typical” for a trait, 
we cannot just look at what is typical right now. We have to examine the trait’s behavior 
over a slice of time that includes the present moment and reaches far back into the past: 
“Obviously, some of the species’ history must be included in what is species-typical 
(2002, 99; my emphasis).” He tells us that this time-slice should be longer than “a 
lifetime or two,” and might include “millennia.”   
 
This is an extraordinary admission, given that much of Boorse’s core argument for his 
view was propped up on the claim that both biology and intuition need purely ahistorical 
functions, uncluttered by history. His admission implies that his two key arguments for 
the view don’t work. First, by his own lights, it’s not the case that biologists don’t refer to 
history; implicitly, when they talk about what’s statistically-typical, they are talking 
about history. Second, regardless of whether or not intuition supports ahistorical 
functions, Boorse’s theory doesn’t. It’s just not true, on Boorse’s account, that if lions 
popped into being from an unparalleled saltation, their distinctive parts and processes 
would have functions. They wouldn’t, since they don’t have the right history (or to be 
more precise, they have no history at all).  
 
 
3. The Propensity Theory 
 
Bigelow and Pargetter (1987) also developed an influential “ahistorical” theory of 
function, the propensity theory. They reject the selected effects theory (and etiological 
accounts more generally) because the selected effects theory gets the modality of 
functions wrong. In other words, the statement, “functions are selected effects,” if true, is 
contingently true; it might be true on the actual world, but there are possible worlds at 
which it’s false. To illustrate the point, they ask us to consider a world that is pretty much 
the same as ours except that it randomly popped into being five minutes ago. On that 
world, they claim, there would still be functions, just no selected effects (188): “we have 
the intuition that the concept of biological function…[is] not thus contingent upon the 
acceptance of the theory of evolution by natural selection.” This consideration prompts 
the need for an ahistorical theory.  
 
For Bigelow and Pargetter, functions are propensities, or probabilistic dispositions. We 
might quibble over what exactly dispositions are, but any good definition will cite three 
parts: structure, environment, and behavior. Consider the solubility of salt. There is a 
structure, namely, the polar molecular structure composed of sodium and chloride; there 
is an environment, namely, water; there is a behavior, namely, dissolving. When we say 
that salt is disposed to dissolve in water, we’re saying that, if you were to take something 
with this structure, and put it in this environment, it would perform this behavior, all 
things equal.  
 
Functions, too, are dispositions. Consider “the function of the heart is to circulate blood.” 
For this statement to be true, there must be a structure (the heart, embedded the right way 
in the circulatory system), an environment (which they call the creature’s natural 
habitat), and a behavior (conferring a fitness boost on the organism). If one were to put 
the structure in its natural habitat, it would increase the fitness of the organism (relative, I 
suppose, to creatures without hearts). The crucial distinction between their view and 
Boorse’s is that in their view, a trait’s function doesn’t depend on actual frequencies of 
performance. A trait needn’t have an actual track record of boosting fitness to have a 
function; a mere propensity will do.  
 
This raises the thorny question of what a creature’s natural habitat is. For they’re clear 
that a creature’s natural habitat isn’t just any environment the creature happens to find 
itself in. Curiously, they refuse to define this crucial notion; instead, they brush it off as 
vague, but unproblematically so: “there may be room for disagreement about what counts 
as a creature’s ‘natural habitat;’ but this sort of variable parameter is a common feature of 
many useful scientific concepts” (192). But one could at least form the suspicion that if 
one analyzed this unproblematically vague notion, one would find some reference to 
history tucked away inside of it.  
 
This suspicion is confirmed in the very next paragraph of their paper. There, they tell us 
that, if a creature’s environment were to change very suddenly, then “natural habitat” will 
still refer to the old environment, and not the new one (ibid). There’s a time lag built into 
the very idea of a natural habitat. So, for example, if climate change melts enough Arctic 
ice, then, at least for a time, the polar bear’s natural habitat (and by extension, the natural 
habitat of the trait itself, namely, their thick, water-repellant fur) is the icy habitat of yore 
and not the contemporary, denuded one. They take that as given, and I agree.  
 
But why would this be? What makes it the case that, in cases of rapid habitat change, 
“natural habitat,” at least for a time, refers to the old environment and not the new one? 
What makes it true, I suspect, is that the idea of a natural habitat is an intrinsically 
historical notion. It’s something like the environment within which the species recently 
survived and thrived. And if that’s not what a natural habitat is, I would like to know 
what it is such that, if a creature’s actual habitat shifts suddenly, the natural habitat, for a 
little while, is still the old one. Just because a concept is vague around the edges, that 
doesn’t excuse one from the obligation to give some sort of analysis. Perhaps one could 
revise the theory and drop all reference to “natural habitat,” as suggested by Griffiths 
(2009, 27), but that remains to be worked out in a rigorous way. Moreover, it’s not clear 
whether such a theory, when rigorously developed, would hang together with the two 
adequacy criteria.  
 
Hence, I conclude that, contrary to rumor, the propensity theory is not an ahistorical 
theory, or not demonstrably so. But if that’s right, proponents of the propensity theory 
lose one of the main virtues of the view, which is to get the modality of functions right. 
To be fair, there’s still a sense in which their view is ahistorical. What they can do, that 
the selected effects theorist can’t, is to attribute functions to novel traits – so long as that 
novel trait belongs to the members of a species that has been around long enough to have 
a natural habitat. Suppose a gene mutation confers a benefit on an organism, say, 
pesticide resistance in a flour beetle. I suppose they can say that, at the very moment at 
which it first confers that benefit, the gene mutation has a function, namely, to make the 
beetle withstand a certain pesticide. This result, they claim, is “intuitively comfortable” 
(195). But they can say that only because flour beetles themselves have a history, and so 
we can talk meaningfully about their natural habitats. Moreover, I think they’ll still have 
a rough time explaining dysfunction (Neander 1991, 183), for reasons I’ll point to in the 
next section. Finally, I think there are good theory-neutral reasons for saying that 
beneficial traits, on their very first appearance, don’t have functions, but rather, whatever 
benefit they bring is a lucky accident. But I won’t argue for that here (see Garson 2019, 
Chapter 2).  
 
4. The Causal Role Theory 
 
What about the causal role theory of function? This appears to be a purely ahistorical 
view. The causal role theory says, roughly, that the function of a component of a system 
consists in its contribution, in tandem with the other components, to a system-level 
capacity of interest (Cummins 1975; Craver 2001; Hardcastle 2002). Craver (2001) 
helpfully elaborates this view by specifying that the part in question must be a component 
of a mechanism. All of the basic ingredients of this theory, it seems, are ahistorical: 
capacities, components, organization, hierarchy, interests. Even if the world were created 
five minutes ago, in pretty much its present form, things would still have causal role 
functions.  
 
The problem enters when we think about dysfunction. Cummins (1975, 758) insisted that 
functions are dispositions, or capacities: “…to attribute a function to something is, in 
part, to attribute a disposition to it.” The function of a trait token, then, consists in its 
capacity to contribute to a system-level effect. But what if the token in question, through 
defect or disease, loses the capacity, and so can’t contribute to the system-level effect? 
Then, by Cummins’ analysis, it doesn’t have the relevant function – so it can’t be 
dysfunctional either.  
 
Causal role theorists have, by and large, been silent about how to make sense of 
dysfunctions from this perspective. Almost everything they’ve had to say on that score, 
however, is consistent with the following theme: a trait token is dysfunctional when it 
can’t do what other trait tokens generally, or typically, do to contribute to the system-
level effect of interest. Consider Godfrey-Smith (1993, 200): “Although it is not always 
appreciated, the distinction between function and malfunction can be made within 
Cummins’ framework…If a token of a component of a system is not able to do whatever 
it is that other tokens do, that plays a distinguished role in the explanation of the 
capacities of the broader system, then that token component is malfunctional.” Craver 
(2001, 72), offers the same general line: “…the ascription of a function to a malformed or 
broken part is derivative upon a description of how that type of part (X) fits into a type of 
higher-level mechanism (S). The malformed and broken part can be identified as an X by 
the typical properties and activities of Xs....” This is, at root, to rely on a statistical norm 
for making sense of dysfunction.  
 
This account of dysfunction, like Boorse’s, stumbles when it encounters the problem of 
pandemic dysfunction. For the modification suggested above implies that, if everyone’s 
heart seized up at once, nobody’s heart would have a function anymore, so nobody’s 
heart would be dysfunctional. The best way to solve this problem, and perhaps the only 
way, is the way Boorse took, namely, to say that the function of a trait is its typical 
contribution to some system effect, where what’s typical is assessed over a chunk of time 
that stretches back into the past, for at least “a lifetime or two,” and perhaps “millennia.” 
But if causal role theorists take that line, they’d have a historical theory.  
 
Craver (2001) and Hardcastle (2002) suggest, all too fleetingly, a different way of 
thinking about dysfunction, one that depends not on statistics, but on our values, that is, 
the values and goals of people who make function attributions. Craver (2001, 72) 
suggests that traits are dysfunctional when they cannot do what people want them to do: 
“the mechanistic role of the broken part only appears against the fixed backdrop of shared 
assumptions about a type of mechanism within which parts of this type generally (or 
preferably) make important contributions.” The parenthetical remark alludes to a 
substantially new doctrine, one that demands our full concentration. It suggests that 
dysfunction is a mirror of human preferences and goals, of our wishing and wanting. If 
my heart seizes up, it’s dysfunctional, since it’s not doing what I want it to do.  
 
Hardcastle (2002) makes remarks along similar lines. She first says that the function of a 
trait – what it’s “supposed to do,” as she puts it – depends on the goals of the scientific 
discipline that makes the investigation: “The teleological goal for some trait…depends 
upon the discipline generating the inquiry” (153). The palmomental reflex causes a chin 
twitch when you stroke an infant’s palm; it’s just an accident of cortical wiring with no 
deep evolutionary rationale. Still, she says, it has the function of indicating the state of 
brain development in infants, because that’s how biomedical researchers use it. She then 
says that something is malfunctional just when it cannot do what it’s supposed to do 
(152). The palmomental reflex is malfunctional when it can’t indicate the state of brain 
development. Simply put, dysfunction happens when a trait can’t do what we want.    
 
But dysfunctions can’t be reduced to mere preferences in any straightforward way; this is 
a point that’s been taken in the literature for decades (e.g., Boorse 1977, 544; Wakefield 
1992, 372), for reasons that scarcely need to be rehearsed. I’d prefer not to need sleep and 
water; I’d prefer if nobody had to go through the pain of childbirth or teething, either. But 
none of those things are dysfunctions. For that matter, I’d prefer if my hands were 
equipped with retractable adamantium claws. The fact that my hands can’t do what I 
want them to do doesn’t make them dysfunctional. If one really wanted to run with this 
value-centered line about dysfunction, one would at least have to add that, in order for a 
trait to be dysfunctional, it’s not enough that it doesn’t do what I prefer, but I must also 
have a reasonable expectation that it should act in the way that I prefer. But what could 
possibly ground a reasonable expectation that my hand (say) work in a certain way? Only 
this: that hands usually do work in the preferred way. But then we’re back to statistical 
norms, and long historical slices of time. This value analysis of dysfunction isn’t a 
contender to a statistical analysis; instead, the former presupposes the latter.   
 
I’ve walked through three allegedly ahistorical theories of function, and shown that none 
of them are purely ahistorical; they’re infected with history. The conclusion will say what 
we should do next.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
There are no ahistorical theories of function, at least among the mainstream theories that 
are put forward as ahistorical. The first, Boorse’s goal-contribution theory, explicitly 
refers to what’s statistically typical for a trait, where what’s typical is assessed over a 
long historical period of time. The second, the propensity theory, refers to the creature’s 
natural habitat, which is implicitly historical. And the third, the causal role theory, can’t 
hope to make sense of dysfunction (or so I argue) without appealing to a statistical norm, 
and thereby (following Boorse) to history. None of these theories will give functions to 
the parts of swamp creatures, instant lions, or anything on worlds that are similar to ours 
except for being randomly generated five minutes ago. The propensity theory, at least, 
can give functions to novel traits as soon as those traits begin benefiting their bearers, as 
long as the population in which the traits emerge has been around for long enough to 
have something like a natural habitat. But even that theory will probably encounter 
problems when it comes to making sense of dysfunction, though I haven’t pushed that 
line in any detail here.   
 
If my thesis is correct – that there are no ahistorical theories of function – three 
consequences immediately follow. First, we need to jettison this whole way of dividing 
up theories of function. The distinction between etiological and non-etiological theories 
serves us much better. An etiological theory holds that function ascriptions either are, or 
purport to be, causal explanations for the existence of traits. Non-etiological theories hold 
that function ascriptions are not, and they don’t purport to be, causal explanations for 
traits. But the crucial point is that being etiological and being non-etiological are just two 
different ways of being historical.  
 
Second, given that there are no ahistorical views, the two main arguments that have 
repeatedly been put forward for those theories – the argument from intuition and the 
argument from ordinary biological usage – don’t actually work. If we took those 
arguments seriously, they’d count as evidence against these allegedly ahistorical theories. 
That doesn’t mean those theories are wrong. It does mean, however, that we need to 
rethink, from the ground up, the motivation for accepting those theories.  
 
A third consequence is that one popular way of thinking about function pluralism must 
fail. This sort of pluralist wishes to sort all biological usage under two main umbrella 
theories, the selected effects theory and the causal role theory. An argument for this sort 
of pluralism is that it mirrors the two main uses of “function” in biology, the historical 
sense and the ahistorical sense. If I’m right, this incarnation of the pluralist project can’t 
work either.  
 
True, there are some theories of function I haven’t addressed here, which fall a bit outside 
of the mainstream. Might those come to our rescue? In particular, one might wonder how 
the modal theory of function (Nanay 2010) fares with respect to my analysis. The modal 
theory holds that a function of a trait token depends on that token’s behavior on nearby 
possible worlds, where what’s “nearby” depends on our explanatory interests. I agree that 
this is an ahistorical theory through and through, since what function a trait has, and 
whether or not it’s dysfunctional, depend on what’s going on at other possible worlds, 
rather than the actual past. But it also yields a deeply implausible construal of 
dysfunction. As Neander and Rosenberg (2012) point out, if the modal theory is right, 
then many traits that biologists don’t think of as dysfunctional, like the trait of lactose-
intolerance in most Pacific Islanders, would actually be dysfunctional. So, while the 
modal theory doesn’t violate the letter of my second adequacy condition – namely, that it 
should allow for the possibility of dysfunction – it violates the spirit of that condition by 
carving up functions and dysfunctions in a wildly revisionary way.  
 
Nanay (2012) argues that the fact that function ascriptions are relative to our explanatory 
interests can somehow lessen the sting of this counterintuitive consequence, but I don’t 
see how that helps. To illustrate the problem, consider Temitope, an evolutionary 
geneticist who’s interested in how human beings might evolve in the near future. 
Temitope considers a possible world to be “nearby” if, at that possible world, she has a 
counterpart, and her counterpart’s genome differs from hers by only a single point 
mutation, but the rest of the world is largely the same (yielding at least 3 billion nearby 
worlds). She reasons that, on some of those possible worlds, some of her traits would do 
things that enhance her inclusive fitness. For example, we might suppose that there is a 
possible world at which her body’s ability to dissolve arterial plaque is substantially 
enhanced, one at which she has tetrachromatic vision, and one at which she’s resistant to 
malaria. She realizes, with dismay, that her body’s actual ability to dissolve arterial 
plaque represents a dysfunction. In fact, she realizes that, relative to her explanatory 
interests, she has many more dysfunctions than she ever thought possible. So even if we 
agree that function ascriptions are tethered to explanatory interests, we still get deeply 
revisionary consequences. In my reckoning, a theory that hangs together pretty well with 
ordinary biological usage is better than a deeply revisionary one, all things equal (see 
Garson 2016, 105-7, for further discussion). 
 
There’s a twist to my story, which I alluded to in the introduction. I think there is a 
prominent sense of “function” in scientific circles that is ahistorical. Consider that 
climate change is a function of deforestation, poor academic performance is a function of 
malnutrition, and wildlife habitat is a function of soil. These notions are ahistorical 
through and through. “Function,” in this context, means little more than “effect,” and 
perhaps (as in the last of the three examples) “helpful effect.” But this tepid sense of 
function isn’t going to sustain a distinction between function and accident, nor will it give 
us any sense of dysfunction. This is the sort of “function” that Bock and von Wahlert 
(1965, 274) were getting at when they equated functions with “all physical and chemical 
properties arising from [the trait’s] form.” It’s also the sort of “function” that Neander 
(2017) describes in her recent discussion of “minimal functions.” But the proponents of 
the allegedly ahistorical theories want functions to do much more than that. They are 
trying to capture the ordinary biological sense (or an ordinary biological sense) of 
“function,” where functions differ from accidents and sometimes things are 
dysfunctional. Unfortunately, they can’t have what they want.  
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